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For eleven years, cybersecurity experts from around the globe have gathered 
in Tallinn, Estonia for the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence’s annual Cyber Conference (or “CyCon”).1 Estonia is the perfect 
venue for such a conference, both because its government has invested heavily 
in digital infrastructure,2 and because a massive 2007 cyberattack effectively 
shuttered Estonia’s economy.3 In short, Estonia is heavily invested not only in 
moving its people, businesses, and government into the digital age, but also in 
ensuring the security of cyberspace. 
During the CyCon keynote opening speech on May 31, 2019, Estonia’s 
president, Kersti Kaljulaid, stressed the importance of international law and 
NATO’s “collective defense posture,” and explained why such unity is 
necessary in cyberspace.4 President Kaljulaid’s many comments received 
widespread attention, none more so than the following: “Estonia is furthering 
the position that states which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures 
to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation. The 
countermeasures applied should follow the principle of proportionality and other 
principles established within the international customary law.”5 
Countermeasures are “State actions, or omissions, directed at another State 
that would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and that are 




* Assistant Professor, United States Naval Academy, Department of Cyber Science. Thanks to Evan 
Field, Ido Kilovaty, and Kurt Sanger for valuable feedback. The views expressed in this Article are only 
the author’s and do not reflect those of the Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, or Department of 
Defense. 
1 See CYCON, https://cycon.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
2 See Nathan Heller, Estonia, The Digital Republic, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic (“The normal services 
that government is involved with—legislation, voting, education, justice, health care, banking, taxes, 
policing, and so on—have been digitally linked across one platform, wiring up the nation.”). 
3 See Damien McGuinness, How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia, BBC (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415 (“The result for Estonian citizens was that cash machines and 
online banking services were sporadically out of action; government employees were unable to 
communicate with each other on email; and newspapers and broadcasters suddenly found they couldn't 
deliver the news.”). 
4 President Kaljulaid at CyCon 2019: Cyber Attacks Should Not be an Easy Weapon, ERR NEWS 
(May 29, 2019), https://news.err.ee/946827/president-kaljulaid-at-cycon-2019-cyber-attacks-should-
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own internationally wrongful acts or omissions.”6 As will be described in Part I 
of this Essay, countermeasures are typically carried out by the State that has 
experienced a violation of international legal obligations, and it is unsettled 
whether an uninjured State could carry out countermeasures on behalf of another 
State. In her CyCon speech, President Kaljulaid made clear that such 
“collective” countermeasures in cyberspace are not only permissible, but 
desirable. “The threats to the security of states increasingly involve unlawful 
cyber operations,” she said. “It is therefore important that states may respond 
collectively to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is insufficient, 
but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. Allies matter also in cyberspace.”7 
Kaljilaid then stated that “in many ways there is nothing really that special 
or groundbreaking.”8 That might be short selling the importance of her clear 
statement. To have the president of a nation—particularly a NATO member that 
is at the forefront of cybersecurity policy—clearly urge the use of collective 
countermeasures is remarkable. Shortly after President Kaljilaid’s comments, 
Naval War College Professor Michael Schmitt, a leading scholar in the 
application of international law to cyber operations, noted that the use of 
collective countermeasures “remains unresolved in international law, and 
therefore ripe for interpretation by States. Estonia was the first State to publicly 
speak to the issue, and it did so unequivocally.”9  
In this Essay, I argue that President Kaljilaid’s call for collective 
countermeasures is the correct normative approach. Just as the threats that 
nations face in cyberspace often cross borders, so, too, should the ability to 
prevent and mitigate harm. The limited guidance from international legal 
authorities has not directly condoned collective countermeasures. Under the 
traditional countermeasures model, State A can exercise countermeasures 
against State B only if State B has violated an international legal obligation to 
State A. While there is good reason for this legal position, it was developed 
before the era of cyber aggression, and fails to address the disperse and 
asymmetric nature of modern threats. To be sure, collective countermeasures 
should be used carefully and should be subject to the same restrictions as 
individual countermeasures.   
Part I of this Essay defines countermeasures and outlines their limitations, 
including an overview of the historical debate over collective countermeasures. 
Part II examines the use and potential use of countermeasures to combat 
evolving threats that nations face in cyberspace and argues that these new 
developments suggest a reconsideration of the general sentiment against 
collective countermeasures. Part II then addresses the valid concerns regarding 







6 Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response 
Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 700 (2014).  
7 Kaljulaid Comments, supra note 4. 
8 Id. 
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I. THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES 
 
 
Much discussion of the international law of war in cyberspace focuses on 
the ability of a state to justify forceful responses against another state in self-
defense,10 an exception to the U.N. Charter’s general rule that states may not use 
force. However, for a state to qualify for that exception, it must have been the 
target of an “armed attack” (or, under the United States’ view, at least a use of 
force).11 Whether an incident rises to the level of “use of force” or “armed 
attack” is fact-specific and open to significant debate. To date, cyber incidents 
that clearly qualify as such have been rare.12 
Despite the scarcity of cyber “armed attacks” or “uses of force,” malign 
activity abounds in cyberspace, and it often violates the sovereignty or other 
legal rights of target states. This malign activity, however, has been of a lower 
intensity that does not rise to the level of armed attack, and therefore cannot be 
addressed by self-defense.13 As General Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S. 
Cyber Command, wrote in a 2019 article, “The locus of struggle for power has 
shifted toward cyberspace, and from open conflict to competitions below the 
level of armed attack.”14 Indeed, in 2018, the United States military amended its 
cyber strategy to one of “persistent engagement” that “defend[s] forward to 
disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls 




10 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack,” JUST 
SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-operations-u-s-definition-armed-
attack/. 
11 Id. (“A widely accepted view of the UN Charter is that a State can use force in self-defense only 
in response to an ‘armed attack,’ which is importantly defined as the gravest forms of force in scale and 
effects. In contrast, the United States has long maintained that a State can use force in self-defense in 
response to any amount of force by another State.”). 
12 See Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures, 32 TEMPLE INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 127 (2018) (“[T]here is a consensus that cyber operations are capable of rising to the level 
of an armed attack that would trigger the right to self-defense. It is also clear that cyber operations can 
violate the use of force prohibition. In such cases, a state could respond appropriately with either cyber 
or non-cyber countermeasures, both in anticipation of an armed attack and in response to a use of force. 
Happily, this situation of threatened armed attack is not the norm in today’s world, whether through cyber 
or non-cyber operations.”). 
13 See Michael J. Adams & Megan Reiss, How Should International Law Treat Cyberattacks Like 
Wannacry?, LAWFARE (Dec. 22, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-should-
international-law-treat-cyberattacks-wannacry (“Setting aside the lack of consensus regarding the 
applicability of particular international law rules and principles applicable to cyberspace activities (for 
instance, the principle of sovereignty and rules regarding civilian objects and military objectives), our 
leading concern is that U.S. elected officials and their appointees sometimes appear ill-informed about, 
or unencumbered by, the use of force and armed attack thresholds established in Articles 2(4) and 51 of 
the U.N. Charter, respectively.”). 
14 Paul M. Nakasone, A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations, 92 JOINT FORCE Q. 10, 11 (2019); 
see also Michael P. Fischerkeller & Richard J. Harknett, Through Persistent Engagement, the U.S. Can 
Influence ‘Agreed Competition’, LAWFARE (Apr. 15, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
through-persistent-engagement-us-can-influence-agreed-competition (agreeing that “U.S. concern has 
broadened to include not only an adversary’s potential use of cyber means to engage in coercion and 
operations equivalent to a kinetic armed attack, but also cyber campaigns that can achieve strategic 
outcomes without resort to war”).  
15 DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY, CYBER STRATEGY (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/ 
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Forward” is the “clearest indication of the U.S. recognition that cyber threats do 
not merely take the form of discrete events but also are continuous operations 
that must be defended against in real time.”16 
Although target states cannot address this lower intensity cyber aggression 
through self-defense, they have other options. They could conduct espionage 
operations to gather information about their adversaries’ methods and 
capabilities, in an effort to better prepare their own defense. They could engage 
in retorsion, which is “an unfriendly but legal act in response to a malicious or 
hostile act not amounting to a use of force[,]”17 such as trade sanctions or 
diplomat expulsion. Perhaps the most aggressive response to sovereignty 
violations that are not uses of force or armed attacks, however, are 
countermeasures.   
Countermeasures “are actions or omissions by an injured state directed 
against a responsible State that would violate an obligation owed by the former 
to the latter but for the qualification as a countermeasure.”18 Unlike retorsions, 
countermeasures typically would violate international law absent the initial 
state’s violation of international law. The International Law Commission, in its 
2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (“the Draft Articles”), stated that “The commission by one State of an 
internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in 
taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to 
achieve reparation for the injury.”19 Countermeasures are a particularly useful 
component of newer operational concepts such as Defend Forward, which 
recognizes the need to continuously defend against operations that do not rise to 
the level of armed attack.20 
In the Draft Articles, the Commission recognized that countermeasures are 
susceptible to misuse or overuse, and therefore articulated a number of 
restrictions, including that “they be directed at the responsible state and not at 




COMMAND, ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY, COMMAND VISION FOR U.S. CYBER 
COMMAND, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April% 
202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010 (“Adversaries continuously operate against us below the 
threshold of armed conflict. In this ‘new normal,’ our adversaries are extending their influence without 
resorting to physical aggression.”). 
16 Jeff Kosseff, The Contours of ‘Defend Forward’ Under International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 2019 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, at 4 (2019).  
17 Charlie Dunlap, Cyber Operations and the New Defense Department Law of War Manual: Initial 
Impressions, LAWFARE (June 15, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-operations-and-
new-defense-department-law-war-manual-initial-impressions. 
18 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, at 111 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
19 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 75 (2001) 
[hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility]. 
20 See Kosseff, supra note 16, at 7 (“To the extent that the operations do raise concerns about 
sovereignty, these activities could be legally justified as countermeasures if conducted to inhibit a 







22 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 10:1 
 
possible.21 Moreover, countermeasures should be “proportionate,”22 meaning 
the that they “must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into 
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in 
question.”23 Before implementing countermeasures, the Draft Articles call on 
the target state, with some exceptions, to request that the responsible state “fulfill 
its obligations” under international law, “notify the responsible State of any 
decision to take countermeasures[,] and offer to negotiate with that State.”24 
States must terminate their countermeasures “as soon as the responsible state has 
complied with its obligations” under international law.25 
To understand the utility of countermeasures in cyberspace, consider the 
following hypothetical example. State A’s government computer systems 
experience repeated denial of service attacks, slowing down State A’s ability to 
deliver a wide variety of services, such as passport processing and tax 
administration. State A attributes the attacks, with a high degree of certainty, to 
a government entity within State B. While it is unlikely that the denial of service 
attacks would constitute an armed attack or a use of force, there is a reasonable 
argument that they violated international legal obligations to State A, either by 
intervening in the state’s internal or external affairs through coercion26 or by 
usurping State A’s “inherently governmental functions.”27 Accordingly, State A 
could argue that under the law of countermeasures, it could conduct 
operations—targeted at the systems of State B that are targeting State A—that 
are not armed attacks or uses of force, in an effort to slow or cease State B’s 
malign activities.   
A more difficult question arises if State A has limited capabilities, 
technological resources, and staffing to penetrate State B’s systems. Could State 
A’s better-resourced ally, State C, exercise countermeasures on behalf of State 
A? In other words, could State C engage in collective countermeasures with the 
goal of causing State B’s operations against State A to cease? Traditional 




21 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 129; see also Paul A. Walker, Law of the 
Horse to Law of the Submarine: The Future of State Behavior in Cyberspace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, at 99 (2015) (“The purpose of using a 
countermeasure is to effect a return to the status quo ante, that is, to get the offending State to resume its 
obligations under international law. As such, the countermeasure(s) that a State undertakes should 
generally be temporary and reversible, so as not to create a permanent violation of international law.”). 
22 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 134. 
23 Id. at 134–35 (“Proportionality is concerned with the relationship between the internationally 
wrongful act and the countermeasures. In some respects, proportionality is linked to the requirement 
specified in Article 49: a clearly disproportionate measure may well be judged not to have been necessary 
to induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations but to have had a punitive aim and to fall 
outside the purpose of countermeasures enunciated in article 49.”).  
24 Id. at 135.  
25 Id. at 137.  
26 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 312.  
27 Id. at 111. See also Kosseff, supra note 16, at 8–9 (“The United States may only engage in 
operations that qualify as countermeasures in response to an adversary’s breach of international legal 
obligations owed to the United States. Such a breach would occur if another state usurped inherently 
governmental functions, such as by initiating cyber operations that prevent a government from collecting 
taxes or conducting elections. Moreover, the international legal principle of non-intervention prohibits a 
state from intervening, through coercion, in another state’s internal or external affairs, including the 
choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”) 
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equivocal “probably not,” though there are reasonable arguments both in support 
and opposing collective countermeasures.  
The closest statement to “binding law” on the issue came from a 1986 
International Court of Justice case that Nicaragua brought against the United 
States, arising from U.S. support for contra rebels in Nicaragua.28 Among the 
United States’ justifications for its assistance of the contras was that Nicaragua 
had provided assistance to armed opposition in El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Costa Rica, “and ha[d] committed trans-border attacks on those two states.”29 
The International Court of Justice concluded that the United States could not 
justify its actions as countermeasures taken against Nicaragua on behalf of these 
other countries. Although self-defense to armed attacks may be conducted 
collectively, the Court reasoned that such an option is not available for 
countermeasures: 
 
The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them 
to have been established and imputable to that State, could only 
have justified proportionate countermeasures on the part of the 
State which had been the victim of these acts, namely El 
Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify 
countermeasures taken by a third State, the United States, and 
particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of 
force.30 
 
The International Law Commission, in the 2001 Draft Articles, grappled 
with the limited guidance as to the ability of states to exercise collective 
countermeasures. In a review of the Commission’s deliberations that led to the 
2001 Draft Articles, Otto Spijkers wrote that some states advocated for an 
explicit approval of collective countermeasures, but they were met with strong 
opposition that ultimately defeated the prospect: 
 
For example, China believed that ‘collective countermeasures 
could become one more pretext for power politics in 
international relations, for only powerful States and blocs of 
States are in a position to take countermeasures against weaker 
States.’ Similarly, Russia remarked that ‘[i]t would be 
unacceptable for any State to take countermeasures at the 
request of any injured State, because that would give the big 
Powers the opportunity to play the role of international 
policemen.’ Some States did not reject collective 
countermeasures per se, but demanded more safeguards 
against abuse. For example, the Republic of Korea suggested 
that ‘further efforts should be made to find a way to reduce 
arbitrariness in the process of their implementation, and to 




28 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 20 (June 27). 
29 Id. at ¶ 248. 
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‘stressed that countermeasures should not be used by powerful 
States as a means of coercing smaller nations.’ Many States 
expressed their desire for some provisions on dispute 
settlement, presumably as a means to prevent the abuse of 
(collective) countermeasures.31 
 
James Crawford, who served as the Commission’s Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility from 1997 to 2001, wrote that collective countermeasures 
were the “issue that caused the most difficulty in the final stages” of the Articles’ 
drafting.32 Crawford wrote that collective countermeasures had some supporters, 
but ultimately, not enough. “In the end, discretion seemed the better part of valor, 
particularly having regard to the interaction of these issues with the general 
mandate of the Security Council,” he wrote.33 
The lengthy and spirited debate is evident in the text of the Draft Articles, 
which do not directly address the legality of collective countermeasures, but 
dance around the issue quite a bit. The Articles first note cases in which countries 
have collectively responded to other countries via export and import bans, 
suspension of landing rights, and condemnation.34 Article 48 allows a non-
injured state to invoke another state’s responsibility if “the obligation breached 
is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the 
protection of a collective interest of the group,” or “the obligation breached is 
owed to the international community as a whole.”35 The international law 
regarding collective countermeasures, however, is “uncertain,” as “State 
practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States,” the Commission 
wrote.36 The Commission concluded that “it is not appropriate to include in the 
present articles a provision concerning the question whether other States, 
identified in Article 48, are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce 
a responsible State to comply with its obligations.”37 Thus, Article 54 states that 
the countermeasures chapter “does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled 
under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to 
take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and 
reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the 
obligation breached.”38 The clause is intended to “reserve[] the position and 
leave[] the resolution of the matter to the further development of international 
law.”39 Article 54’s reference to “lawful measures” instead of 
“countermeasures,” the Commission wrote, is intended not to “prejudice any 
position concerning measures taken by States other than the injured State in 




31 Otto Spijkers, Bystander Obligations at the Domestic and International Level Compared, 1 
GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 47, 75–76 (2014) (quoting from International Legal Commission proceedings 
before the United Nations) (internal citations omitted). 
32 James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 884 (2002). 
33 Id. 
34 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 138.  
35 Id. at 126. 
36 Id. at 139.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 137 (emphasis added). 
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or those owed to the international community as a whole.”40 Indeed, the Draft 
Articles stated that “[o]ccasions have arisen in practice of countermeasures 
being taken by other States, in particular those identified in Article 48, where no 
State is injured or else on behalf of and at the request of an injured State.”41 The 
Articles state that these types of countermeasures “are controversial and . . . 
embryonic,” and that the Articles chapter regarding countermeasures “does not 
purport to regulate the taking of countermeasures by States other than the injured 
State.”42 
The Draft Articles reflect a very tentative and open-ended compromise that 
was the result of significant disagreement among states. According to a summary 
of the Sixth Committee’s proceedings prepared by the United Nations 
Secretariat’s office, some members worried about the potential for “abuse” of 
such tools: 
 
The taking of collective countermeasures by groups of States, 
on behalf of an injured State, outside the context of action by 
universal or regional international organizations, was opposed. 
Others urged limiting the right to take countermeasures to the 
State that was directly injured. It was further argued that the 
relationship between collective countermeasures and Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter was problematic; and that collective 
countermeasures raise the problem of the coordination 
between the States taking such measures.43 
 
The removal of explicit provisions for collective countermeasures was well-
received in the United Nations General Assembly. According to a summary of 
the Sixth Committee’s proceedings the following year, the revisions to Article 
54—and removal of explicit provisions for collective countermeasures—“made 
it possible for the Draft Articles to be acceptable to all.”44 In a 2002 article, 
David J. Bederman, who provided the Commission with comments on the Draft 
Articles as chair of the American Society of International Law’s Panel on State 
Responsibility, described the rationale for Article 54 and the reasoning for 
ultimately deciding to exclude a provision that allowed collective 
countermeasures: 
 
To articulate a rule for collective countermeasures prematurely 
would run the risk of “‘freez[ing]’ an area of law still very 
much in the process of development.” But to say nothing on 
the subject might have raised the (apparently) false impression 
that collective countermeasures were barred and that only 
“injured States,” as defined in the articles, were eligible to 




40 Id.  
41 Id. at 129. 
42 Id. 
43 Summaries of the Work of the Sixth Committee, GAOR, Fifty-Fifth Session, https://www.un.org/ 
law/cod/sixth/55/summary.htm. 
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only possible political solution—was to defer debate to 
another day and to allow customary international lawmaking 
processes to elaborate any conditions on the use of collective 
countermeasures.45 
 
Although the Draft Articles do not explicitly allow collective 
countermeasures, they do not explicitly prohibit them. As Mehrdad Payandeh 
wrote in 2010, the Articles do not “answer the question of whether the resort to 
countermeasures by states that are not directly affected is legal when a serious 
breach of a peremptory norm is involved.”46 Still, the limitation to “lawful 
measures” can be read to disfavor collective countermeasures.47 Indeed, many 
argue that collective countermeasures are impermissible under current norms.48 
In short, the circa-2001 consensus did not explicitly approve of collective 
countermeasures, in large part due to the many concerns that some states raised 
during the discussions. However, it is clear from the Commission’s debate on 
the subject that even in light of the Nicaragua opinion, there was not an 
enthusiastic consensus on the prohibition of collective countermeasures, as at 
least some states recognized the value in allowing nations to work together to 
cause the cessation of internationally wrongful acts.   
 
 
II. THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN CYBERSPACE 
 
 
Legal experts have generally continued to be averse to collective 
countermeasures when applying international law to cyber conflict. The most 
thorough documentation of the prevailing views on the topic appears in the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations,49 
published in 2017. The Tallinn Manual sets forth black-letter rules, drawn from 
the body of international law and analyzed by a group of legal scholars who 
apply that law to the cyber realm. At the outset, it is important to note that while 




45 David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 828 (2002).  
46 Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 511 
(2010).  
47 See Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 798, 805 (2002) (“The fear is that the rights conferred by Article 48(1) could be used to justify 
politically motivated acts or unilateral interventions by a state to enforce international law. To guard 
against the possibility that a state might be subjected to countermeasures based on a spurious legal claim 
that it has breached an obligation toward the international community as a whole, the chapter on 
countermeasures, in Article 54, limits the right of any state entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
state under Article 48(1) to ‘lawful measures.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
48 See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Prime Minister May’s Use-of-Force Claim: Clarifying the Law That 
Governs the U.K.’s Options, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/prime-
minister-mays-use-force-claim-clarifying-law-governs-uks-options (“Only states that are injured may 
impose countermeasures: This means that a victim state’s allies may not impose ‘collective 
countermeasures’ on the wrongdoing state if only the victim state was actually injured.”). But see Schmitt, 
supra note 9 (noting that “the right to take collective countermeasures remains unresolved in international 
law”). 
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any particular state’s formal position on international law, nor does it represent 
any state’s domestic law. The topic of collective countermeasures, however, did 
not draw a unanimous consensus. Rule 24 provides that “[o]nly an injured state 
may engage in countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not.”50 That 
commentary appears quite straightforward, and generally in line with the 
Nicaragua ruling and Draft Articles. However, the commentary accompanying 
Rule 24 suggested disagreement on the use of collective countermeasures in 
cyberspace.  
The Tallinn Manual’s commentary acknowledges that the group of legal 
experts could not reach consensus as to whether Article 48 of the Draft Articles 
permits a state that was not “directly injured” by a responsible state to “resort to 
countermeasures, as distinct from lawful measures, such as retorsion, to ensure 
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or the 
beneficiaries of the obligation.”51 The commentary to Rule 24 of the Tallinn 
Manual notes that states “routinely cooperate” on cyber defense initiatives, and 
that such collaborations are permissible provided that they do not violate 
international law.52 The commentary notes, however, that this observation “begs 
the questions of whether a State or group of States may conduct countermeasures 
on behalf of another State, as well as whether they may assist a State that is 
conducting countermeasures.”53 Most of the legal experts who drafted the 
Tallinn Manual answered “no,” adhering to the rule set forth in Nicaragua, 
though a “few” experts opined that “a non-injured State may conduct 
countermeasures as a response to an internationally wrongful act committed 
against an injured State so long as the latter requests that it do so.”54   
Moreover, the legal experts were divided as to whether a non-injured state 
could provide a state with guidance on conducting cyber countermeasures.55 
Some of the experts concluded that “measures designed to facilitate 
countermeasures” are impermissible.56 Some concluded that legality “depends 
on whether they would violate a legal obligation owed to the State against which 
the countermeasure is directed by the State providing assistance.”57 Another 
group of experts concluded that such assistance is legal.58 The Tallinn Manual 
notes that all three groups agree that “a State that aids or assists a cyber operation 
that fails to qualify as a countermeasure may be held responsible for aiding or 
assisting an internationally wrongful act.”59 Moreover, the Tallinn Manual’s 
authors agree that if an aggressor that violates its international legal obligations 
to a group of states may face countermeasures from those states, including 
through coordinated actions, provided that these countermeasures are 




50 Id. at 130. 
51 Id. at 131. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 131–32. 
54 Id. at 132.  
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particularly important observation because of the interconnectivity and 
interdependency that characterizes cyberspace.”61 The Tallinn Manual’s general 
(though far from absolute) inclination to reject collective countermeasures in 
cyberspace is largely accepted.62 
The interconnectivity and interdependency that the Tallinn Manual’s 
authors discuss is precisely the reason why we must rethink the aversion to 
collective countermeasures, at least so far as they are used in cyberspace. The 
general reluctance to endorsing collective countermeasures stems from a 1986 
International Court of Justice ruling, as interpreted by the International Law 
Commission in 2001, during the early years of the modern Internet. These rules 
were crafted years before most experts could have predicted some of the modern 
threats that nations face from other state actors.  
Consider, for instance, the NotPetya attack, which Wired magazine aptly 
called in 2018 “the most devastating cyberattack” in history.63 As part of its 
cyber conflict with Ukraine, Russia in 2017 unleashed the malware, which 
exploited a vulnerability at a small Ukrainian software company to deploy 
malware that “was honed to spread automatically, rapidly, and 
indiscriminately.”64 Because of the indiscriminate nature of this cyberattack, 
organizations around the world faced immense outages, delays, and costs. A year 
after the attack, the Wall Street Journal summarized some of the global damage: 
 
After NotPetya, FedEx has spent roughly $400 million in 
remediation and related expenses, the company told analysts 
in an earnings call last week. At Merck, NotPetya temporarily 
disrupted manufacturing, research and sales operations, 
leaving the company unable to fulfill orders for certain 
products, such as the Gardasil 9 vaccine, which prevents 
cancers and other diseases caused by the human 
papillomavirus. The cyberattack cost Merck about $670 
million in 2017, including sales losses and manufacturing and 
remediation-related expenses, according to the company. . . . 
Global advertising company WPP PLC, law firm DLA Piper 
LLP, snack maker Mondelez International Inc. and other 
multinationals said they lost basic systems such as email and 
systems for invoices and customer orders in the attack. Some 
have since reported related dips in revenue and increases in 
technology spending. Danish shipping giant A.P. Moller-




61 Id.  
62 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 6, at 729 (“This is a particularly important restriction in the context 
of both internationally wrongful cyber acts and cyber countermeasures, for it precludes an injured State 
that lacks the technical capabilities to engage in cyber countermeasures from seeking the assistance of 
States possessing them.”).  
63 Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of Notpetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History, 
WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-
crashed-the-world. 
64 Id. (“‘To date, it was simply the fastest-propagating pierce of malware we’ve ever seen,’ says Craig 
Williams, director of outreach at Cisco’s Talos division, one of the first security companies to reverse 
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paralyzed some systems in its container business and 
prevented customers from booking ships and receiving 
quotes.65 
 
The United States and United Kingdom attributed NotPetya to Russia.66 
International law would allow not only the Ukraine, but the United States, 
Denmark, and any other state that was substantially impacted by NotPetya to 
engage in countermeasures to cause Russia to cease its unlawful behavior. 
However, such countermeasures are only permissible once the damage has been 
done in those target countries. Would the United States have been permitted to 
assist Ukraine with countermeasures to fend off early versions of NotPetya and 
any predecessor attacks or intrusions that targeted Ukraine? The answer to that 
question depends in large part on whether collective countermeasures are 
permissible.   
Under the prevailing view among the Tallinn Manual’s drafters, other states 
would not be able to exercise countermeasures to cease Russia’s violations of 
legal obligations owed to Ukraine; only after Russia also violated international 
legal obligations owed to the state that seeks to implement the countermeasures.   
One might ask: why the need for collective countermeasures? There are at 
least five strong and related reasons that the international legal community 
should take a bolder stance in favor of limited forms of collective 
countermeasures. 
First, the reluctance to endorse collective countermeasures is more tenuous 
in the cyber realm than in the kinetic realm due to the highly interconnected 
nature of threats in cyberspace.67 The prevailing conservative approach to 
collective countermeasures was more justifiable in cases such as Nicaragua, in 
which the spillover effects from Nicaragua’s acts were not nearly as extensive 
as cases such as NotPetya. Granted, the United States attempted to justify its 
actions as countermeasures because Nicaragua had assisted armed groups in El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, and such assistance could impact global 
stability and, in turn, U.S. interests. However, such impacts are highly attenuated 
at best. A cyberattack initially aimed at one country, in contrast, is much more 
likely to threaten the interests of other nations, even if they were not the initial 
targets. As seen in the NotPetya aftermath, the global and interconnected nature 
of the Internet makes it so much more susceptible to an act that initially targeted 
State A causing very real impacts in State B (whether or not those impacts were 
intended). State B has a strong interest in working with State A—and other like-
minded nations—to stop illegal cyber operations in their earliest stages. Indeed, 




65 Kim S. Nash, Sara Castellanos & Adam Janofsky, One Year After NotPetya Cyberattack, Firms 
Wrestle With Recovery Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-after-
notpetya-companies-still-wrestle-with-financial-impacts-1530095906.  
66 Id. 
67 See POLLY M. HOLDORF, PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY REGIME, U.S. AIR 
FORCE INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, STRATEGIC PAPER 10 (2015) (“As the world becomes more 
interconnected, the security and prosperity of each state will be contingent on the security and prosperity 
of other states, incentivizing great powers to cooperate more closely with each other, particularly 
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the aggressor state “to cease the internationally wrongful conduct[.]”68 The 
impacts of violations of international legal obligations in the kinetic world—
such as supporting armed rebellions—are far more likely to be contained to the 
target nations than cyber threats. Earlier thinking about collective 
countermeasures developed largely with kinetic threats in mind. At the very 
least, the international legal community must evaluate whether the continued 
opposition to collective countermeasures is desirable and effective for cyber 
operations.  
Second, some states have far more sophisticated cyber capabilities than 
others, and collective countermeasures allow them to leverage those 
comparative advantages. To be sure, one distinguishing feature of cyber 
operations is their relative asymmetry.69 A state need not have thousands of 
troops to execute an effective cyber countermeasure. Nonetheless, there are 
significant differences among state cyber capabilities.70 A small state that has 
invested less in its cyber forces could stand to benefit greatly from collective 
countermeasures, as Gary Corn and Eric Jensen recently wrote: 
 
Assume the technologically less capable victim state desires to 
respond to an illegal act with a cyber countermeasure because 
it believes such a response is less likely to lead to escalation, 
but it does not have the cyber capability to do so. Allowing 
collective cyber countermeasures would thus better serve 
international peace and security. Additionally, assume the 
victim state has some limited cyber capabilities, but not to the 
degree of its allies. Though the victim state may be able to meet 
the requirements of a proportional and reversible cyber effect, 
it may still desire some outside assistance in scoping and 
containing the specific cyber effect. In this case, a collective 
countermeasure would also be a preferred option.71 
 
The potential for assistance in cyber operations is significant. Collective 
countermeasures are most closely linked to collaboration on offensive cyber 
measures, as those might raise concerns about violating international legal 
obligations. Additionally, collaboration may allow nations to conduct operations 
that do not raise international legal concerns, such as espionage and assisting 
with cyber defense. Although the nations can collaborate on espionage and 
defensive assistance in a world without collective countermeasures, those 




68 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 130. 
69 See Andrew Phillips, The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare, USNI (Oct. 14, 2012), 
https://news.usni.org/2012/10/14/asymmetric-nature-cyber-warfare (“All you need is a computer, 
Internet connection, and the time and patience to learn about software, hardware, and network 
vulnerabilities. Anyone can learn about and create effective cyber weapons. That’s why non-nation-state 
combatants are the most common potential adversaries.”). 
70 See Schmitt, supra note 9 (“Thus, it is only logical that Estonia and other States that lack the 
capacity to confidently deal with hostile cyber operations on their own would want collective cyber 
countermeasures to be on the table in order to deter powerful opponents from targeting them in 
cyberspace and to respond effectively should deterrence fail.”). 
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collective countermeasures are permissible would foster collaboration in these 
other areas as well.  
Third, collective countermeasures allow states to better address the 
persistent nature of the threats that they face in cyberspace. Cyber hostility is 
more likely to consist of constant adversarial actions, rather than the discrete 
events that shaped the debate over collective countermeasures in the non-cyber 
context. Nicaragua’s assistance to armed groups in three other states consisted 
of distinct and separate acts. Compare that to the constant drumbeat of sub-
armed conflict cyber threats that nations face on a routine basis. Indeed, as 
Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett wrote, the new U.S. cyber 
strategy of persistent engagement “recognizes that cyberspace’s structural 
feature of interconnectedness and its core condition of constant contact creates 
a strategic necessity to operate continuously in cyberspace.”72 To be sure, 
substantial, discrete hostilities still could occur in cyberspace (including those 
that might rise above the armed attack threshold), but the current experiences 
reflect the reality of a much more constant drumbeat of lower level operations. 
Such persistent threats require states to use available tools, which typically will 
not rise to the level of self-defense. Collective countermeasures allow states to 
collaborate, pool resources, and more effectively combat this steady stream of 
threats.  
Fourth, the mere prospect of collective countermeasures could well have a 
significant deterrent effect. If a state notoriously has weak cyber (and kinetic) 
defense, it might at first appear to be a ripe target for collective countermeasures. 
This is because it is unlikely that the target state would impose substantial costs 
as a result of the action. Under a system that permits collective countermeasures, 
however, the aggressor state might be less likely to conduct such operations out 
of fear of countermeasures implemented by the target state’s better-resourced 
allies. Paul Leaf made a case for such rationale in the non-cyber context, arguing 
that if Chinese actions against American allies in Asia “threaten America’s vital 
security interests, Washington must respond appropriately, and preferably 
alongside its Asian partners. Collective countermeasures are less likely to arouse 
major Chinese retribution, and they will deepen integration between the United 
States and its friends in Asia.”73 
Fifth, collective countermeasures could reduce the likelihood of escalation 
by increasing the chances that responses to cyber aggression remain below the 
use of force. If a target state is in desperate need of assistance from its allies, it 
might be more inclined to classify an adversary’s actions as an armed attack, in 
an effort to justify an allied response. Corn and Jensen note that depriving states 




72 Michael P. Fischerkeller & Richard J. Harknett, Persistent Engagement and Tacit Bargaining: A 
Path Toward Constructing Norms in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Nov. 9, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/persistent-engagement-and-tacit-bargaining-path-toward-constructing-norms-
cyberspace.  
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an incident in an attempt to allow the use of kinetic tools to resolve the 
conflict.”74 
The concerns raised during the drafting of the Articles cautioned that 
powerful states could use collective countermeasures as a pretext for acting as 
“international policemen.”75 Such worries about abuse are not unfounded; 
indeed, unrestricted use of collective countermeasures could lead to substantial 
escalation and abuse. That is why collective countermeasures would be subject 
to all of the limitations that apply to countermeasures taken by the target state. 
It also would be reasonable to impose additional responsible limits on third 
parties seeking to engage in collective countermeasures. For instance, it would 
be reasonable to require a request from a victim state before allowing a third 
party to engage in collective countermeasures. Moreover, the third party should 
publicly commit to the same countermeasure limitations that the victim must 
adhere to, such as notification and accepting liability for exceeding the scope or 
magnitude of permitted countermeasures. It also might be reasonable to expect 
the third party to only engage in a range of collective countermeasures 
authorized by the victim state; in other words, collective countermeasures should 
not provide a third party with a carte blanche to violate the sovereignty of 
another state.  
Collective countermeasures would only be triggered by an internationally 
wrongful act to another state. State A, for instance, could not arbitrarily justify 
its actions against State B as collective countermeasures unless there has been 
an actual violation of legal obligations to another state.76 Moreover, collective 
countermeasures, as with any other countermeasures, would only serve the 
purpose of “induc[ing] a responsible State to comply with the legal obligations 
it owes an injured State.”77 A state could not use countermeasures for punitive 
purposes.78 Further, a state must cease countermeasures once the aggressor state 
no longer is violating international law.79 Suppose, for instance, that Russia was 
to unleash another malware attack that initially targets a software company in 
Ukraine. Under a system that permits collective countermeasures, the United 
States could engage in limited cyber operations aimed at the Russian systems 
that are targeting the Ukrainian company. Those countermeasures may only be 
targeted at Russia and with the purpose of causing Russia to cease deploying 




74 Corn & Jensen, supra note 12 (“States that are not cyber capable, or that are less cyber capable 
than the responsible state, may not feel they have adequate means to effectively apply non-kinetic 
responses that comply with all the countermeasure requirements. In those cases, it is possible that victim 
states will define the responsible state’s unlawful act as an armed attack in order to expand possible 
responses into an area where the victim state’s capability is relatively more robust.”).  
75 See Spijkers, supra note 31, at 75. 
76 See ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 129 (“An injured State may only take 
countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce 
that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two.”).  
77 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 116 (Rule 21 (1) provides that “[t]hey are a remedy 
designed to lead to a return to lawful relations between the States concerned.”). 
78 Id. (“Punishment and retaliation are impermissible purposes.”). 
79 See ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 137 (“Article 53 deals with the situation 
where the responsible State has complied with its obligations of cessation and reparation under Part Two 
in response to countermeasures taken by the injured State. Once the responsible State has complied with 
its obligations under Part Two, no ground is left for maintaining countermeasures, and they must be 







2020 COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN CYBERSPACE 33 
 
 
Moreover, to the extent that a state exercises collective countermeasures in 
response to an injury suffered by another state, the magnitude of the 
countermeasure is limited. The countermeasures also must be “proportionate,” 
meaning that they are “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into 
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in 
question.”80 Proportionality is evaluated objectively.81 In its discussion about 
countermeasure proportionality, the Tallinn Manual states that relevant factors 
include “the injury suffered (i.e., the extent of harm), the gravity of the wrongful 
act (i.e., the significance of the primary rule breached), the rights of the injured 
and responsible state (and interests of other states) that are affected, and the need 
to effectively cause the responsible state to comply with its obligations.”82 There 
is no reason to apply a less stringent standard to collective countermeasures. A 
non-injured state’s exercise of collective countermeasures should be 
proportionate to the injury suffered by the target state. Such proportionality 
restrictions are consistent with Kaljulaid’s 2019 speech at CyCon, in which she 
stated that collective countermeasures “should follow the principle of 
proportionality and other principles established within the international 
customary law.”83 In the example above involving Ukraine, the United States 
would only be permitted to exercise countermeasures that are commensurate 
with the injury that Ukraine already had suffered (and, of course, below the level 
of a use of force).   
Furthermore, it is possible for a non-injured state to merely assist the target 
state, allowing the target state to implement the countermeasures. Such an 
arrangement likely would raise fewer concerns under international law. Under a 
broad conception of collective countermeasures, non-injured states do not 
necessarily need to implement the countermeasures. Rather, they could assist 
the injured state in engaging in the countermeasure. Indeed, some of the 
international legal experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual believed that such 
assistance is permissible.84 How would this look in practice? Imagine if the 
election systems of a small state with relatively unsophisticated cyber operations 
are persistently targeted by another state. A larger and more capable ally of that 
smaller state could advise the smaller state not only on methods to shore up its 
own defenses (something that raises no legal issues), but also on tactics to 
infiltrate the systems that are targeting its election infrastructure in an effort to 
disable the adversary’s offensive capabilities. The larger state’s purely advisory 
capacity should raise fewer legal concerns than a situation in which the larger 





80 Id. at 134 (Art. 51(1) provides that “[p]roportionality provides a measure of assurance inasmuch 
as disproportionate countermeasures could give rise to responsibility on the part of the State taking such 
measures.”).  
81 See Crawford, supra note 32, at 883 (“The motivations of governments are notoriously difficult to 
assess: a countermeasure may be disproportionate even when the government has no ulterior motive, and 
proportionate even if the intention was to harm.”). 
82 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 128.  
83 Kaljulaid Comments, supra note 4; see also Schmitt, supra note 9 (“If the law is followed, their 
effect will be stabilizing, not escalatory.”). 
84 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 132 (“A third group of Experts was of the view that 
providing assistance to an injured State engaged in countermeasures is lawful on the basis that such 












For good reason, the international legal community has been reluctant to 
enthusiastically endorse the use of collective countermeasures. Critics of such a 
system raise valid concerns that such actions could be subject to abuse, and that 
they could escalate tensions. Although these concerns remain just as valid today 
as when they were first raised decades ago, we also must consider the 
countervailing benefits that they produce for the cyber realm. The 
interconnected nature of cyberspace, along with the constant barrage of low-
intensity threats, requires us to reconsider the aversion to the use of collective 
countermeasures. If enacted with significant limitations, such as proportionality, 
collective countermeasures could provide a net benefit to efforts to bolster cyber 
defenses against persistent bad actors, while minimizing the potential for abuse 
and escalation.  
 
